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COMMENTS

ANNEXATION BY MUNICIPALITIES
IN GEORGIA
In the research made for the writing of this comment it
was gratifying to find that the decisions are not in conflict.
The law pertaining to annexation was firmly established at
an early date and has remained somewhat constant, despite
the formidable array of confusion and uncertainty in other
phases of municipal law.
The following exposition on annexation attempts (I) to
recapitulate the law as it exists in Georgia, (2) to consider
the applicable statutory provisions, and (3) to conjecture
as to the effect of recent decisons by the State Supreme Court
collaterally affecting annexation. The attempt last mentioned will be given particular emphasis, because of its importance as a practical matter.
I
"The legislature giveth and the legislature may take
away" is the bedrock and essence of all legislation and
judicial decision concerning municipalities in the State of
Georgia. It is a fortiori the rational foundation sustaining
the formulation of the law of annexation.' In 1823 the
Supreme Court declared that public corporations created
for the purpose of city government may be controlled by the
,legislative power, in any manner as the public interest may
require, provided it does not conflict with any constitutional
provision.! This concept has been attacked as unconstitutional on every conceivable ground, to be discussed later,
but without success.3
Generally, annexation is accomplished by a local act of
the General Assembly amending the charter of a particular
city so as to extend the corporate limits to take in additional
adjacent territory.' Such act usually provides for an election
4.

Farmer v. Town of Thomson, 133 Ga. 94, 65 S.E. 180 (1909).

1. Cash v. Town of Douglasville, 94 Ga. 557, 20 S.E. 438 (1894).
2. State v. City of Savannah, R. M. Charlton 250 (Ga. 1823).
3. Farmer v. Town of Thomson, 133 Ga. 94, 65 S.E. 180 (1909);
State v. Southern Express Co., 133 Ga. 113, 65 S.E. 282 (1909);
Murray v. City of Waycross, 171 Ga. 484, 156 S.E. 38 (1930)
Pierce v. Powell, 188 Ga. 481, 4 S.E.2d 192 (1939).
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to determine whether the unincorporated territory shall be
annexed.' However, an election is not obligatory,6 because
the General Assembly may extend the corporate limits
of a municipality without the consent of those residing or
owning property in the added territory.7 Nonetheless, the
usual practice is to provide for a referendum vote to determine whether the act should go into effect.'
Under such circumstances, unless otherwise provided for
by law, debts of a municipal corporation contracted before
the limits were extended, are chargeable upon the city as
enlarged by the territory added, as well as upon that includedin the boundaries before they were extended Such
transfer of debt liability does not violate the constitutional
provision as to debts of municipal corporations, nor does it
impair the obligation of municipal bonds."0
All the inhabitants and their property within the boundaries as enlarged are alike subject to taxation to raise municipal revenue for all legitimate purposes. This is true regardless of the time when some of the liabilities arose to which
the revenue is to be applied. 1
Where the territory to be annexed is itself a chartered
city, the act providing for annexation impliedly contemplates
that its terms will become binding and result in the repeal
of the charter of that city, from and after the date specified
in the act for the law to go into effect. 12 When the annexed
territory becomes incorporated as part of the other city,
public assets and liabilities both are passed to that city. 3 As
to creditors and all other persons, the annexed municipal
5. For example, see Ga. Laws 1906, No. 555, p. 1010.
6. White v. City of Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68 S.E. 103 (1910).
7. Toney v. Mayor of Macon, 119 Ga. 83, 46 S.E. 80 (1903), appeal
dismissed, want of jurisdiction, 195 U.S. 625, 25 S.Ct. 791, 49
L. Ed. 350 (1904).
8. Davidson v. Town of Kirkwood, 152 Ga. 357, 110 S.E. 154 (1921).
9.
10.

See note 2 supra.
U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10; GA. CONST. Art. I, § 3
CODE ANN. § 2-301 (Rev. 1948). See Note 2 supra.

(1945),

GA.

11. See note 7 supra.
12. Walker v. Mayor of East Rome, 145 Ga. 294, 89 S.E. 204 (1916).
13.

See note 7 supra.
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corporation thereafter ceases to exist for all purposes."
It furnishes no ground for attack upon the act that the
inhabitants of the added territory or owners of property
therein will be subject to taxation on account of municipal
improvements previously made in the old territory.15 Neither
is it ground for attack that it is inequitable to include them
in the corporate limits, or tax them on their property like
other inhabitants of the city because the new territory is not
at once fully supplied with municipal improvements and conveniences as that within the original limits. 6 Nor does the
added liability so imposed deny to them the equal protection of the laws."
The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that a citizen
has no vested rights to determine in what particular political
subdivision of the state the spot he selects for his residence
shall remain."8 However, the court conceded that equity
could restrain proceedings instituted illegally under color
of law, the effect of which would be to change such citizen's
domicile from one political subdivision to another.' The
court later modified this by holding that when the General
Assembly provides for an election to determine the question
as to whether the territory of one municipality shall be
annexed to the territory of another municipality, and no
provision is made in the act for judicial interference, and
there is no general law authorizing such interference, and
the authority to interfere cannot be derived from the common law, a court of equity has no power or jurisdiction over
the matter. All questions arising out of the matter must be
determined by the tribunal constituted by the General Assembly for that purpose."
Once the boundaries of a city are established by the General Assembly, they remain as prescribed until changed by
that body. They cannot be contracted or extended by the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See note 7 supra.
White v. Mayor of Forsyth, 138 Ga. 753, 76 S.E. 58 (1912).
Ibid.
See note 7 8upra.
Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Ga. 56 (1855).
Town of Roswell v. Ezzard, 128 Ga. 43, 57 S.E. 114 (1907).
Ivey v. City of Rome, 129 Ga. 286, 58 S.E. 852 (1907).
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local governing body. This is true notwithstanding acquiescence by city council in a survey fixing and marking limits
different from those prescribed and established by the act. "1
From the foregoing it can be seen that the Supreme Court
considers annexation to be within the General Assembly's
control solely. This view calls for no argument, absent constitutional home rule. However, the views expressed by the
General Assembly through statutory enactments do deserve
to be considered.
II.
At present there are in force two statutory provisions
providing for annexation. One of them authorizes annexation by ordinance in certain cases." Action under authority
of this section is predicated upon the signed petition of all
of the owners of all of the land proposed to be annexed.
This method of annexation is cumulative of all other
methods now existing or thereafter adopted. However, it is
not operative in counties having wholly or partly within
them a city with a population of more than 2oo,ooo, nor
does it apply to cities having a population of 5o,ooo or more
according to the 1940 United States census or any future
census.
The other statutory provision is embodied in the Municipal Home Rule Act of i95i.3 This Act authorizes the incorporation of adjacent territory, other than that then
embraced within another municipal corporation, upon affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified voters voting
in elections in both the existing municipality and the territory to be so incorporated, computed separately. The ordinary of the county in which the territory proposed to be
so incorporated lies must, upon notice from the governing
authority of the municipality, or upon receipt of a petition
signed by thirty per cent of the qualified voters in the terri21.

A survey was authorized by ordinance and acquiesced in for
period of thirty years in Martin v. City of Gainesville, 126 Ga.
577, 55 S.E. 499 (1906).
22. Ga. Laws 1946, No. 579, p. 130; GA. CODE ANN. § 69-901 (Supp.
1947).
23. Ga. Laws 1951, No. 125, § 3(j), p. 1 1 6.
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tory proposed to be annexed, call a special election of the
qualified voters in the area so proposed to be incorporated
to be held not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days
from the time such notice is received, to determine whether
they favor such incorporation. Publication in the official
gazette of the county once a week for four weeks next preceding the election is required. Only those whose names are
included on the qualified list of voters residing in the territory proposed to be incorporated, as certified by the registrars of the county, and who own property therein, are
eligible to vote in such election. The laws governing special
elections, except to the extent changed by the act, govern
such election. The provisions of the Home Rule Act are
not applicable in any county wherein both a county and a
separate or independent school system exist unless the
petition signed by the qualified voters of the territory proposed to be annexed is accompanied by the approval in
writing of a majority of the county board of education of
the county wherein the territory proposed for annexation
lies.24
If the election is in favor of incorporating such territory
into the municipality, that fact must be certified by the
ordinary to the governing authority of the municipality and
another election must be held for the qualified voters of the
municipality in the same manner as prescribed for the qualified voters of the territory to be annexed not less than
thirty nor more than sixty days thereafter. Publication of
such election once a week for four weeks next preceding the
election is also required in the official gazette of the municipality. If both elections are in favor of incorporating the
additional territory into the municipality, it immediately
becomes a part thereof. The governing authority must
certify to the Secretary of State the new corporate limits
of the municipality and all courts are required to take
judicial notice thereof. The statute is not operative in cities
with a population of more than 200,000 persons whose
boundaries extend into two or more counties.2"
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
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It is apparent that these provisions merely relieve the
General Assembly of the burden of providing in detail for
annexation in each particular case. The general structure
and characteristics of the law of annexation remain undisturbed. Furthermore, it should be noted that the ultimate
effect of annexation takes place on the local level, and it is
here that annexation becomes problematical. The problem
is viewed in its true perspective by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which declared:
"The residents and property owners of annexation areas are
vigorously opposed thereto. This is not surprising. A like condition has existed in nearly every effort of a Virginia city to annex
suburban areas.

26

The above quotation exposes the real problem, but in
this case a disclosure is not a solution.
Charter restrictions are such that citizens of territories
to be annexed are usually given the opportunity to vote for
or against annexation. They almost always vote against it.
Political considerations often exert a powerful influence
upon the General Assembly to restrain it from providing for
annexation without the consent of those affected, regardless
of the greater expediency attainable by that method. A
deadlock between politics and progress ensues. The effect
of this stalemate upon everyday affairs demands a consideration of recent judicial decisions which, although not directly concerned with annexation, affect it in no small degree.
III.
Recently, the city council of Augusta adopted an ordinance requiring users of city water outside the city limits to
pay double the city water rate. Later, they adopted another
ordinance assessing the privilege of connecting, or continuing connections, with the city sewer system outside of
the corporate limits of the city. A failure to pay either the
increased rate or the assessment would result in the city's
discontinuing the services.
26.

The court added,

"

.

.

.this ground is insufficient to deny annex-

ation." Norfolk County v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45
S.E.2d 136 (1947).
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Residents of Forrest Hills, owning improved property27
west and southwest of the city limits, filed three petitions
against city council to determine the validity of the ordinances. They complained: (i) that the city was under contract to furnish them water and sewerage service upon the
same terms and conditions applicable to the city; (2) that
the ordinance discriminated against them in favor of the28
citizens of Augusta in violation of the State Constitution
and the Constitution of the United States; 9 and (3) that
its passage was not for the legitimate purpose of collecting
revenue, but that it was passed through malice, and was an
unjust and illegal attempt to force them to consent that
their property be brought within the corporate limits of the
city."

Demurrers of the city to these complaints were sustained
and the complainants appealed. On April IO, 195o the Su-

preme Court of Georgia rendered decisions in the three
cases. All justices concurred in finding as a matter of law:
(i) that a municipal corporation has no power to make
contracts restricting or limiting its legislative or governmental powers. Furnishing water and sewage disposal is a
governmental function and any attempt to assume contractual obligations with reference to it is ultra vires and
void;"' (2) that an ordinance, which provides that rates
for water services shall be higher in territory outside the
corporate limits, is not unconstitutional and void as denying
"due process" and "equal protection" under federal and
state Constitutions; " and (3) that the complainants have
no right to equitable relief, because the courts will not inquire into the motives of a municipal council in the enactment of an ordinance.
27. Each entitled Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 750, 753
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

and 756, 58 S.E.2d 820, 823 and 825 (1950).
CA. CONST. Art. I, § 3 (1945) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 2-302 (Rev. 1948).
U. S. CONST. Art I, § 10, el. 1.
See note 28 supra.
Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ca. 750, 58 S.E.2d 820
(1950).
Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ca. 753, 58 S.E.2d 823
(1950).
See note 32 siipra.
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The rationale expressed by the Supreme Court is that a
municipal corporation may not compel any person outside
its territorial limits to accept public services which it undertakes to furnish, nor may the municipal authorities be
compelled to render such services. Therefore, a municipal
corporation may classify rates to be changed in outlying
territories, and upon a failure of customers to pay such
charges, the municipal corporation may discontinue its
service.3"
The Supreme Court thereby defines a power and illustrates a proper medium whereby city councils can coerce
resolute inhabitants and property owners of outlying districts into petitioning for annexation to the city.3" This resolves, to no small extent, the problem arising from the
present stalemate in annexation. Residents of outlying districts have a tendency to look with disfavor upon annexation.
This is encouraged by the self-interest of county officeholders and their efforts to retain taxable property in the
counties. By adopting the technique employed by the city
council of Augusta in the Barr Cases, other city councils may
greatly minimize the effect of this tendency.
It is elementary that annexation of suburbs by Georgia
cities would substantially increase their revenue in the form
of property and license taxes. Nearly all of these cities are
supplying contiguous communities with water, sewer, light
and gas services. The initial outlay for materials and equipment has been met, and the only expense involved is that
of maintenance-annexation would incur no additional expense. And further, recipients of these services are benefited
by them both directly and indirectly, and it is no more than
equitable that they be made to bear their proportionate
share of the burden of original cost. They now escape the
brunt of civic responsibility while basking in the warmth of
34. See note 28 supra.
35. Where authority has been conferred upon municipal corporations
to operate gas, electric and power plants, the Public Service
Commission does not have power to regulate rates charged thereunder. The power of regulation is in the municipal corporation.
Georgia Public Service Commission v. City of Albany, 180 Ga.
355, 179 S. E. 369 (1935).
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its security; enjoying the fruits of communal association
without having to bear the obligations incident thereto.
This is parasitism at its worst. In a democratic society such
utilization without taxation is equally as obnoxious as taxation without representation.
In passing, it may be said that aside from the economic
advantages to individual cities, unimpeded annexation is
not without its social advantages to the entire state. Building codes now in force in the cities and the influence flowing
from them could be extended to outlying districts. Public
sanitation, safety programs and other long range developments could be put on a more practicable basis by enlarging
their operative scope. Georgia cities can greatly ameliorate
the quality of the public services presently being rendered
if given the time and an increase in resources.
A most cursory analysis of the Barr Cases indicates their
potential effect upon annexation. The method approved
therein by the Supreme Court affords city councils an opportunity to exploit those potentialities. It is concluded that
any method helping to place urban areas under urban government-where they rightfully belong-should be maximized for the public good.
DAVID

R. ROGERS

